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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
GORDON BURT AFFLECK and
JOSEPHINE F. AFFLECK, his wife,
Plaintiffs, Respondents
and Cross Appellants,
vs.

GRANT MORGAN and EVA
MORGAN, his wife,
Defendants, Third Party
Plaintiffs, Appellants and
Cross-Respondents,

Case No.
9350

vs.

DAVID BURT AFFLECK and
ISABELLA D. AFFLECK, his wife,
Third-Party Defendants
and Respondents.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS, RESPONDENTS AND CROSSAPPELLANTS, AND OF THIRD PARTY DEFENDANTS
AND RESPONDENTS

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The "STATEMENT OF THE CASE" set forth in the Brief
of Appellants and Cross-Respondents Morgan is chiefly a
misstatement of the facts. Appellants contradict substantially
all of the admissions of defendant Grant Morgan and of his
witnesses A. Z. Richards and George B. Gudgell III. Appellants
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even dispute the United States survey record and attempt to
move the section line southward to a place where it never
existed. Grant Morgan attempts to vary, extend and enlarge
by argument and by parol his deed descriptions to cover plaintiffs' land, although the Morgans never purchased said land
nor acquired any title to any part thereof, nor any easement
across the same. Since appellants have not stated th~ material
facts, it becomes necessary for respondents to do so. The
details are set forth in the argument.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs and respondents Gordon Burt Affleck and
Josephine F. Affleck, his wife, as record owners brought suit
in ejectment to recover possession and damages from defendants
and appellants Grant Morgan and Eva Morgan. The property
' in Section 22, T. 1 S., R. 2 E., SLM.
is in Mountair Canyon
1t is bounded on the north by the north line of Section 22
and on the south by the north line of Lots 1 and 2 of Merrywood, an unrecorded plat. (R. 1) . The Morgans by answer
and counterclaim falsely alleged that they purchased the
property in 1951 from David Burt Affleck (brother of Gordon
Burt Affleck) , and claimed title by adverse possession. Defendants also sued for $12,000 "damages" for "loss" of the
property if title is adjudged to be in plaintiffs, and also for
"easements" over the property. (R. 6-11). By third-party
complaint the Morgans sued David Burt Affleck and wife to
recover $12,100 for "breach of warranty," alleging that the
property described in the complaint was sold and conveyed
to Grant Morgan by two warranty deeds dated June 2, 1951,
and February 9, 1952, respectively. (R. 34-42). The two deeds
(Exhibits 14-D and 15-D describe lands in Section 15, but
do not cover any land described in the complaint nor any other
land in Section 22.
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Defendants have no record title to any of the land described in the complaint. Defendants offered evidence of tax
receipts, but they do not describe any portion of the lands
conveyed to plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have a clear record title
to the land described in the complaint. The abstract of title
(Exhibit 1-P) shows United States patent to Alvaro A. Pratt
dated December 19, 1907, covering Lots 2, 3 and 4 of Section
22, T. 1 S., R. 2 E., SLM. Said land became identified as Tract
38 of the 1927 Government Resurvey, (Exhibit 6-P). Exhibit
2-P is a bargain and sale deed to plaintiffs dated September 3,
1955. Exhibit 3-P is a correction deed dated Juy 6, 1957,
which covers the land described in the complaint, subject to
a pipeline easement in favor of Lillian B. Affleck and subject
to Restrictive Covenants. Exhibit 4-P is a plat of the various
deed descriptions as platted by Jean R. Driggs, Sr., professional
engineer and land surveyor. Said plat shows that there is no
conflict whatsoever between any land descriptions in the deeds
received by Grant Morgan and the land described in the complaint.
The two deeds to Grant Morgan from David Burt Affleck
and wife, Exhibits 14-D and 15-D, do not cover any land in
Section 22, but land in Section 15. The descriptions are tied
to the northwest cornerof Section 15, and constitute part of
the Old Arm Chair survey of 1901, which was based on the
Ferron survey of Section 15 in 1891. The original section
line between Sections 15 and 22 was established in 1891 by
Augustus D. Ferron, approved March 23, 1894. The survey
plat is Exhibit 7-P. A portion of the field-notes in the United
States Survey Office constitute Exhibit 32-P. Ferron marked
a stationary boulder or ledge 4 feet high for the corner common
to Sections 15, 16, 21 and 22. That monument was found
in a good state of preservation during the Government Resurvey
of Sections 22 and 23 in 1927, Exhibit 34-P.
Section 22 was surveyed in 1902 by A. P. Hanson, survey
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plat approved 1903, Exhibit 21-D (Exhibit 31-P is an enlargement of that plat). Instead of following the original Ferron
north line of Section 22 established in 1891, Hanson established
a "resurvey line" on the excuse that he could not find the
Ferron corner of Sections 15, 16, 21 and 22. On pages 5 and
6 of the brief of the appellants a number of serious misstatements are made with respect to the surveys of Sections 15 and
22. On page 6 appellants falsely assert that "The original
North Quarter corner of Section 22, as established by Hanson,
is 33 feet North of the North line of the Merrywood Subdivision," and also that "The resurveyed North Quarter corner
established by Miller is 22 feet further North of the original
line established by the Hanson quarter comer. (Ex. D-18) ."
Exhibit 35-P is a plat showing the position of the section
lines of the Ferron survey of 1891, the Hanson survey of
Section 22 in 1902, and the Government Resurvey of Section
22 in 1927. Said plat was prepared by Jean R. Driggs, Sr.,
after he made a comprehensive survey of Section 22 including
the property in dispute, Exhibits 37-P and 38-P. It is significant
that A. Z. Richards and George B. Gudgell III, engineers
who testified for the Morgans, did not question the accuracy
of the Driggs survey nor his plattings. To assure the accuracy
of his surveys Driggs made Polaris observations at 5 separate
points or stations in Section 22.
There is a plat in th back of this brief which is a copy
of Exhibit 35-P with other information from the field-notes
and computations shown in red ink. The Hanson north line
of Section 22 was not the original line as represented by appellants, but a "resurvey line" according to Hanson's own field
notes, Exhibit 33-P. Contrary to the assertions of appellants
said Hanson north line of Section 22 was not south, but north
of the section line as reestablished on the Government Resurvey
of 1927. Instead of being 22 feet south of the present section
line, the Hanson north quarter corner of Section 22 was shown
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by the Hanson field notes and the measurements to the known
Hanson corners of the 1927 Government Resurvey, to be 561
feet north and about 2800 feet east of the original Ferron
corner of Sections 15, 16, 21 and 22. Appellants and their
witnesses repeatedly referred to a fictitious monument which
was destroyed in 1927 by the government surveyors as the
"old original corner" and as the "Hanson corner" and as the
"Hanson south quarter corner of Section 15." Hanson never
claimed that he set the south quarter corner of Section 15.
His north quarter corner of Section 22 was set (if set at all)
on his resurvey line. That monument was of different dimensions and marked on the opposite face and about 560 feet
northerly from the rock which was destroyed in 1927. Mr.
Gudgell admitted that he did not know who set the rock
monument which was destroyed, and that it did not fit the
description of the corner which Hanson set in 1902. (R. 248270).
In 1957 Grant Morgan had a survey (Exhibits 30-P and
64-P) by Mr. Gudgel!. Said survey was based on the deed
descriptions. Mr. Gudgell stated that he found no conflict
between the deed descriptions to Grant Morgan and the lands
described in the complaint. The deed to Grant Morgan covering Lots 1 and 2 of Merrywood, (Exhibit 16-D) is on the south
side of the land described in the complaint, and the lands
deeded to Grant Morgan (Exhibits 14-D and 15-D) are on
the north. (R. 240, 244-247, 293-294). In 1957 Mr. Gudgell
made no note of any fences. He made another survey in 1959
which was a fence line survey following certain sections of
fence. (Exhibits 17-P and 18-P). His 1959 survey did not
follow the deed descriptions. He did not tie his survey to any
monument specified in the deeds, but to a nonexistent monument. His plat shows a land description to be 37 feet farther
south than the deed descriptions of Exhibit 14-D and 15-D.
(R. 304-305). At least part of the fence was put up after suit
was commenced. (R. 680-682) .
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding~
for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Defendants introduced in evidence a survey of H. G. Hall
made in 1931 which was supposed to be based upon the descriptions in deeds to the predecessors of David Burt Affleck.
(Exhibit 40-D). A. Z. Richards, partner of H. G. Hall, admitted
that the survey started ''at a stake 1ying on the ground'' and
did not follow the deed descriptions, but was a projection
of some noncontinuous posts, and that such description was
58 feet farther to the south than whar is called for in the
deeds themselves. (R. 434-435, 441-445, 439, 457, 462, 469473, 475-478).
Grant Morgan had his own real estate broker make the
purchase from David Burt Affleck. Affleck asked $7,500,
but Morgan paid only $4,500. Affleck made no representations
as to boundaries nor what he owned. A year previously Morgan
negotiated to purchase from plaintiffs' predecessors the south
161;2 feet of the land described in the complaint, and he knew
that David Burt Affleck wanted to acquire a tract of land on
the north of that 161;2 foot strip. (R. 580-587, 661-664).
Grant Morgan admitted that he paid no attention to boundaries, and that he did not know just where they are. His alleged
improvements were only partially on the land described in
the complaint, made from and after 1954, after he had notice
of his lack of title. His activities were partially concealed by
brush, trees, etc. Grant Morgan took possession of the land
described in the complaint, but he did not pay any taxes
assessed against the land.
POINTS ON WHICH RESPONDENTS RELY ON THIS
APPEAL INCLUDING CROSS-APPEAL
1. Gordon Burt Affleck and wife have a valid record title
to all lands described in the complaint, and were entitled
to decree adjudicating their ownership. The appellants Morgan
never acquired any title to any portion of the land by deed,
by adverse possession, nor otherwise.

6
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2. Contrary to the arguments of appellants, the court did
not quiet title in Gordon Burt Affleck and wife to any land north
of the "Hanson south quarter corner of Section 15."

3. Appellants have no capacity to impeach the 1927 Government Resurvey of Section 22. There is no merit to the
argument that "The court erred in basing title upon the resurvey."
4. The contention that "The decision of the court is inequitable in refusing to recognize reasonable enjoyment of
the land surrounding the Burt Affleck home,'' disregards both
the facts and the law.
5. There is no merit to the argument that "The court
erred in not allowing appellants the opportunity of claiming
recovery for improvements to the land."
6. Contrary to argument of appellants, the trial court
permitted the Morgans to present any competent evidence they
could produce as to alleged easements, as well as any proffers
of proof defendants desired to make.
7. The court pproperly dismissed appellants' third party

complaint against David Burt Affleck and wife. The appeal
is obviously designed for delay to harass said respondents and
this court should assess daamges against the Morgans for
prolonging the groundless litigation against third-party defendants.
8. The evidence does not warrant the granting of any

easement to Grant Morgan and Eva Morgan; and the portions
of the judgment and decree quoted in the cross-appeal should
be stricken from the judgment and decree. The absence of
David Burt Affleck from the State of Utah for a period of
four years constituted a break in the prescriptive period, although fiis absence was due to military service.
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POINT I
GORDON BURT AFFLECK AND WIFE HAVE A
VALID RECORD TITLE TO ALL LANDS DESCRIBED IN
THE COMPLAII\JT, AND WERE ENTITLED TO DECREE
ADJUDICATING THEIR OWNERSHIP. THE APPELLANTS MORGAN NEVER ACQUIRED ANY TITLE TO
ANY PORTION OF THE LAND BY DEED, BY ADVERSE
POSSESSION, NOR OTHERWISE.
There is no merit to the argument of appellants Grant
Morgan and wife that the plaintiffs and respondents Gordon
Burt Affleck and Josephine F. Affleck, his wife, "failed to
prove" a valid record title to the land described in the complaint. By their admission, A. Z. Richards and George B.
Gudgell III, engineers called to testify for the Morgans, helped
to prove the record title of plaintiffs and to destroy all pretense
of title asserted by defendant Grant Morgan.
The land owned by plaintiffs and respondents Gordon
Burt Affleck and wife is 48.7 feet in width on the easterly side
of the Mountair Road in Section 22, Township 1 South, Range
2 East, Salt Lake Meridian. The south line of the tract is the
north line of Lots 1 and 2 of Merrywood. The north line of
the tract is the nortli line of Section 22. Exhibit 1-P is the
abstract of title which shows the patent to Alvaro A. Pratt
dated December 19, 1907, covering Lots 2, 3 and 4 of Section
22, a conveyance to Parker B. Pratt, and a decree of distribution
in the estate of Parker B. Pratt to Paul E. and Maybeth Farr
Reimann. Exhibit 2-P is a bargain and sale deed from the
Reimanns to Gordon Burt Affleck and wife dated September
3, 1955. It clearly conveys all land between Lots 1 and 2 of
Merrywood and the north line of Section 22. Exhibit 3-P
is a correction deed between the same parties dated July 6,
1957.
Exhibit 4-P is a plat of the deed descriptions, with the
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deed description of plaintiffs' lands shown in yellow, the deed
description of lands conveyed to Grant Morgan shaded in
blue, and the description of land conveyed to the David A.
Affleck Association, Inc., indicated in green. Said plat was
prepared by Jean R. Driggs, Sr., professional engineer and
land surveyor, from the deed descriptions after Mr. Driggs
completed an extensive survey of lands in Section 22 in 1958
and 1959, including the land in dispute. See Exhibits 37-P
and 38-P. (R. 334-425). In order to insure the accuracy of his
survey, Mr. Driggs made Polaris observations at five points
in Section 22. (R. 337). Neither of the engineers called to
testify for appellants questioned the accuracy of the Driggs
survey nor the correctness of his plattings. Said plat demonstrates that the descriptions in the deeds to Grant Morgan
do not in any way conflict with the land described in the complaint.
Exhibit 13-D is an abstract of title coveri~g Lots 1 and
2 of Merrywood, an unrecorded plat. Exhibit 16-D is a special
Warranty deed dated October 22, 195 3, covering said land,
from Zion's Savings Bank & Trust Company to Grant Morgan.
The metes and bounds descriptions are tied to Contrary Girl
Rock. The north line of Lots 1 and 2 of Merrywood constitute
the south boundary of the land described in the complaint.
Grant Morgan so admitted at the trial. (R. 572-573).
By answer the appellants made the unfounded claim that
they had purchased the land described in the complaint from
third-party defendants David Burt Affleck and his wife in
1951. The two deeds which they received from David Burt
Affleck, Exhibits 14-D and 15-D do not cover any portion of
land described in the complaint. (Exhibit 30-P, R. 307). Exhibit 14-D is a deed dated June 2, 1951, which covers a tract
of land in Section 15 described as follows:
Beginning at a point in the center of road, said point
being South 83 o 25' East 150.53 feet from stake #31,
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said stake #31 being described in instrument #678340,
Book #74 page 513,a s being 79.16 chains South and
28.91 chains East from the Northwest corner of Section
15, Township One South, Range Two East, Salt Lake
Meridian; thence running North 28° 44' 44" East 94.69
feet; thence South 49° 45' East 130 feet, to the South
line of said Section~ 15; thence West along said Section
line} 75.93 feet, more or less, to stake #32 in the center
of road; thence North 83 ° 25' West 54.07 feet, to the
place of beginning. (Emphasis added).
Except for the portion of the description "to the South
line of said Section 15, thence West along said section line,"
the southerly line of the deed description would be approximately 20 feet north of the south line of Section 15. As shown
by the platting of deed descriptions in Exhibit 4- P, it was
necessary for Mr. Driggs to push stake #31 south about 20
feet in order for the description to extend to the south line of
Section 15 with a closure of the metes and bounds description.
The fact is confirmed by the survey plat made by George B.
Gudgell III for Grant Morgan in 1957, Exhibit 30-P and 64-P.
(R. 293-294). Mr. Gudgell stated that the general rule in
surveying is that when a deed description shows a course to
be so many feet to a section line, the surveyor recognizes the
section line as it then exists. (R. 293). When Mr. Gudgell
made his survey in 1957 he was given the description of
Exhibits 14-D and 15-D, the deeds from David Burt Affleck
and wife to Grant Morgan, and also the deed to Lots 1 and 2
of Merrywood, as the properties he should survey (R. 239240). Mr. Gudgell platted the area between the north line
of Lots 1 and 2 of Merrywood and the north line of Section
22 as about 55 feet in width. (R. 241). He found no conflict
between the north line of Lots 1 and 2 of Merrywood and the
south line of the land described in the complaint. (R. 246247). The deed to Grant Morgan covering Lots 1 and 2 of
Merrywood, Exhibit 16-D does not conflict in its description
with the land described in the complaint. (R. 247). Mr.
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Gudgell did not dispute the accuracy of the Driggs survey
made in 1958 and 1959. In his 1957 survey Mr. Gudgell
located the section line several feet farther north than shown
by Mr. Driggs on Exhibit 4-P. (R. 292).
Mr. Gudgell admitted that the west line of Section 15
as surveyed in 1891 by A. D. Ferron was 80 chains or 1 mile
in length, and that the south line of Section 15 as surveyed by
Mr. Ferron was 80 chains. (R. 250). Mr. Gudgell recognized
that the J. E. Evers survey of Old Arm Chair plat in Section
15 in 1901 was based on the Ferron survey. (R. 255-256, 305).
Mr. A. Z. Richards, professional engineer and land surveyor, who was called to testify for the Morgans, likewise
did not dispute the accuracy of the Driggs surveys. Mr.
Richards recognized that "stake 31" and "stake 32" in the
deed descriptions, Exhibits 14-D and 15-D, had reference to
those points in the "Old Arm Chair Plat," Exhibit 5-P. Mr.
Richards prepared Exhibit 42-D, which showed the position
of those points. Stake # 31 would be 55.44 feet north of the
south line of Section 15 if that section line ran due east and
west. (R. 462). Mr. Richards said that the call in the deed
of 79.16 chains south of the northwest corner of Section 15
would be .84 of a chain or 55.44 feet north of the southwest
corner of Section 15. (R. 469) . He said that the position
of stake # 32 by actual measurement from the northwest corner
of Section 15 would be north of, not on the south line of
Section 15. (R. 457). On his Exhibit 42-D Mr. Richards projected a line due east from the original southwest corner of
Section 15 as set by A. D. Ferron in 1891. Mr. Richards testified that the relocated South quarter corner of Section 15 is
16.13 feet north of that projected line by reason of the fact
that the section line as traced Jon the Government Resurvey
in 1927 has a bearing of North 89° 39' East from the original
southwest corner of Section 15. Mr. Richards admitted that
in platting the deed descriptions on Exhibit 4-P, Mr. Driggs
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had to move stake # 31 south about 20 feet in order for the
description in Exhibit 14-D to reach the south line of Section
15. (R. 469, 477-478).
The deed description of Exhibit 15-D does not extend south
to the south line of Section 15. There is a strip of land between
said tract and the land described in the complaint. Even Mr.
Morgan admitted that there is a gap on the survey plat between
the land described in the complaint and stake #31. (R. 576).
Grant Morgan admitted on deposition that he did not know
what lands are described in the complaint and that he did
not know whether he ever got a deed to any part of that land.
He knew he never got any deed from the Reimanns. (R. 588589).
In 1948 Grant Morgan said he was advised by Dr. Ralph
Pendleton that Paul E. Reimann had bought out the Parker
B. Pratt estate. Mr. Morgan said Dr. Pendleton told him that
the Reimanns had bought lands in Section 22. (R. 580). In
1950 Grant Morgan stated he had negotiations with Dr.
Pendleton to acquire a strip of land 16¥2 feet in width o~
the north side of Lots 1 and 2 of Merrywood, and that he
also had a conversation with Mr. Reimann about it. Mr.
Morgan knew Dr. Pendleton wanted the Reimanns to deed
16¥2 feet of land on the north side of Lots 1 and 2 of Merrywood to Mr. Morgan for some other ground. (R. 580-582).
Mr. Morgan admitted on deposition that he talked to Mr.
Reimann about such a proposed conveyance. Mr. Morgan said
that Dr. Pendleton told him that Dr. Pendleton and the
Reimanns owned that land. Mr. Morgan knew that the
Reimanns had some interest in that land. (R. 585-587).
Grant Morgan admitted that he did not know where the
boundaries of that tract of land are situated on the ground.
On deposition Mr. Morgan tesified that from 1950 to 1956
he did not claim any title to any land which appeared on the
records of Salt Lake County in the names of Paul E. Reimann
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and Maybeth Farr Reimann or either of them, but that as a
result of the survey in 195 7 he claimed title to the land de·
scribed in the complaint. (R. 591-593).
One of the surprise moves in the case was the attempt
of the Morgans to assert title "to a fence line." (R. 584).
Neither the Gudgell survey of 1957 nor the Driggs survey of
1958 and 1959 showed any fence line whatsoever. No claim
of a fence line was made at the pretrial nor in the answer
and counterclaim of the Morgans. Mr. Morgan was permitted
to testify that a fence was erected in 1912 by the "Bell boys,"
who allegedly purchased Lots 1 and 2 of Merrywood. The
alleged location of the fence was entirely on the land dt
scribed in the complaint which was then owned by Alvaro A.
Pratt. There was no pretense of erection of a fence to settle
a boundary dispute between adjoining landowners, nor of
any cultivation to the fence, for the fence ran through marshland and brush. It could not have been a boundary line between
the predecessors of David Burt Affleck of land in Section
15 and the grantees of Lots 1 and 2 as contended by appellants, for the reason that the land of plaintiffs described in
the complaint lies in between. The alleged fence was allegedly
erected on land owed of record by plaintiffs whose predecessors
had nothing to do with its erection. Under the doctrine of
Glenn v. Whitney, 116 Utah 267, 209 P. 2d 257, the alleged
fence entirely on land of a third party could not be treated
as a boundary between lands separated by land owned by
the third party. What appellants attempted to do at the trial
was to retroactively divide a strip of land belonging to the
plaintiff and his predecessors, between the owners of Lots 1
and 2 of Merrywood in Section 22 and between the owners
of Lot 26 of the Old Arm Chair subdivision of Section 15
in defiance of every principle of law.
There is no evidence that any fence was maintained at
any location. Through A. Z. Richards the appellants attempted
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to introduce evidence of a survey by his partner, H. G. Hall,
in 1931. Mr. Richards admitted that his partner was instructed
to survey the lands described in the deeds Exhibits 14-D and
15-D, but that Mr. Hall disregarded the descriptions in the
deeds. There is no reference whatsoever to any fence in either
deed. (R. 469) . Two courses stated in the field book of Mr.
Hall admittedly go in the wrong direction. Mr. Richards
stated that "south 49° 45' west" shown in the Hall field-book
should be "south 49° 45' east/' and that north 83 ° 25' east!)
should read "north 83 o 25' west." (R. 441-442). Instead of
starting where the deed descriptions required a surveyor to
start, Mr. Hall did not bother to measure from the northwest
corner of Section 15, but started at "a stake lying on the ground
near the northwest corner of the tract." (R. 439). Mr. Hall
found some fence posts and he projected the lines of his survey
according to those fence posts. Mr. Richards admitted that
the fence posts did not coincide with the deed descriptions
(R. 458), and that Mr. Hall went 58 feet farther south than
the point where stake 31 is described in the deed (R. 469,
471). Mr. Hall projected his "fence line" across Mountair
Road, although there never was a gate there. (R. 472). The
fence was not continuous, for Mr. Hall found only one post
in place in a distance of 204 feet, and he actually pulled his
descriptions 58 feet farther south than the calls specified in
the deed. (R. 473). Mr. Richards stated that he was not
satisfied with the work done, and he knew Mr. Hall did not
follow the calls in the deed, but he merely had Mr. Hall go
back and tie the fence posts to Contrary Girl Rock. (R. 443445, 469, 475). Such survey was incompetent evidence. There
was no continuous fence. There was no enclosure of any land
by a fence.
David Burt Affleck, third-party defendant and respondent,
who deeded to Grant Morgan by Exhibits 14-D and 15-D lands
in Section 15 only, lived in the canyon near the property in
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question from 1911 on, and he testified that he was not aware
of any fence until 1935, when he put one up along the creek
at the insistence of his wife because she was afraid little
children would get into the creek. He said that fence remained
up until 1941 when he went into the army. He testified that
the fence was not up when he returned in 1944, and there was
no fence up in 1949 when he first saw Grant Morgan in the
canyon. (R. 680-681). Mr. Affleck went up the canyon to
look at the property in September 1959. He saw some cedar
posts with some wire on them. The posts he put in during
1935 were not cedar. When he first went up in September
1959 those posts were not there, and in November 1959
when he inspected the posts they looked like they had just
been put in. (R. 681-682). David Burt Affleck never had any
conversation at any time with Grant Morgan about boundaries.
(R. 682).
Grant Morgan testified that when he bought the land from
David Burt Affleck in 1951 there was still part of a fence
and he took part of it down. (R. 515-517). There was no
testimony that any land was ever enclosed by a fence.
The Gudgell survey of 195 7 was authorized by Grant
Morgan. At the time of the deposition of Grant Morgan his
counsel stated that defendants were relying on the survey
made in 1957. (Exhibits 30-P and 64-P). The survey plat
clearly shows that the deeds to Grant Morgan do not describe
any part of the property described in the complaint. No wonder
Grant Morgan testified that he was "dissatisfied" with such
survey and had Mr. Gudgell make another survey in the fall
of 1959. (R. 577).
The "survey" made by Mr. Gudgell with plat dated
November 30, 1959, (Exhibits 17-D and 18-D), was anything
but a survey of the deed descriptions. Mr. Gudgell admitted
that his survey of 1957 as platted on Exhibits 30-P and 64-P
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followed the deed descriptions. He said he could not find the
northwest corner of Section 15 in the fall of 1959, which
is· the corner to which the deed descriptions to Grant Morgan
from David Burt Affleck are tied. He knew that the southwest corner of Section 15 had been set by A. D. Ferron in
1891 at a point 80 chains south of the northwest corner of
Section 15, but he did not attempt to measure from that
corner. (R. 264). Mr. Gudgell said he tied his 1959 survey
to a nonexistent corner-a corner which was destroyed during
the Government Resurvey of 1927. (R. 292). He repeatedly
referred to it as the "Hanson corner" and as the "old original
corner," but he did not know who set such an alleged monument. He admitted: "I am not saying that the old original
corner was set by Hanson. I don't know who it was set by."
(R. 259). He admitted that what was called the "Hanson
corner'' did not correspond with what Hanson stated in his
field notes that he had established. (R. 273). The markings
were different. He admitted that the line which A. P. Hanson
said he ran in 1902 as the resurvey of the south line of Section
15 was located 8.5 chains north of the Ferron south line of
Section 15 as established in 1891, and that Hanson said he
put in a new section corner for the southwest corner of
Section 15 because he could not find the original Ferron
corner. (R. 282-283). Mr. Gudgell assumed that the destroyed
"monument" which he referred to as the "original corner"
and as the "Hanson corner" was a government survey monument, and that "I am not saying that quarter comer was
Hanson's or was Ferron's. I say we used the quarter corner
referred to in these notes. Who put it in, I don't know."
(R. 284). He said he knew that the Cadastral Engineer "has
a reason" when he destroys a monument. (R. 289) . Mr.
Gudgell knew that the property descriptions were not tied
to any Hanson corner. He knew that the Old Arm Chair
plat of 1901 was based on the Ferron survey of Section 15
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in 1891 because that was the only government survey which
had been made prior to 1901, and that the 0 ld Arm Chair
Survey could not have referred to anything in the Hanson
survey because it was not made until 1902. (R. 284). Mr.
Gudgel! admitted that Exhibit 18-D is in error in referring
to the "original south quarter corner of Section 15" as having
been established in 1890, since the Ferron survey was not
made until 1891 and Ferron did not set the south quarter
corner. (R. 276-277, 305).
Mr. Gudgel! admitted that he did not run into any fence
in 1957 in making his survey to the corner of the house. (R.
316-317). He admitted that by Exhibit 18-D he placed the
property description of land deeded by David Burt Affleck
to Grant Nlorgan a little over 37 feet farther to the south
than what is specified in the deeds themselves. (R. 303-304).
He admitted that "stake 31" mentioned in the deed is 43.79
feet north of the section line as it is now located, if the deed
description is observed. (R. 300-301). The cross-examination
of Mr. Gudgell illustrates that the 1959 survey was made of
fence posts, and some sections of a fence which did not exist
when his 195 7 survey was made. As indicated by the testimony
of David Burt Affleck, at least a part of that fence was put
up after this lawsuit commenced. The 1959 survey was invalid.
It did not pay any attention to the deed descriptions which were
supposed to be surveyed. It arbitrarily moved the property
more than 37 feet farther south than called for by the deeds
themselves, and the descriptions were not tied to any government monument, but to an assumed "quarter corner" which
does not exist and was never part of a government survey.
The contention of Grant Morgan that he bought the land
described in the complaint from David Burt Affleck and wife
is utterly false. Grant Morgan never received a deed from
anyone which describes any part of that land. Exhibits 14-D
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and 15-D, are the only deeds or instruments ever signed
by David Burt Affleck and wife, and both A. Z. Richards
and George B. Gudgell III admitted that the deed descriptions
do not cover any part of the land described in the complaint.
There was no discussion between Grant Morgan and David
Burt Affleck with respect to the purchase of the land described
in those two deeds. (R. 565). David Burt Affleck offered his
property for sale in 1951 for $7,500. (R. 682). Grant Morgan
testified on deposition that in 1951 he told a real estate
broker that he wanted "to buy that particular place and he
arranged to buy it for me" and that the sum of $4,500 was
paid as the purchase price. Mr. Morgan testified also that
the real estate broker carried out his instructions in the acquisition of the property; that he had his real estate broker contact
Burt Affleck to make the~deal, and that he believed his own
real estate broker prepared the deeds. Grant Morgan admitted
that he accepted those deeds and that he received an abstract
of title. (R. 565-566). Mr. Morgan said he could not remember
that he ever told anyone that he claimed title to any land
other than what was described in those two deeds. (R. 567).
Exhibit 64-P is the survey plat covering the 195 7 survey
made by Mr. Gudgell which was used by counsel for Mr.
Morgan on the deposition. (R. 569). Said exhibit was Exhibit
2 on the deposition of Grant Morgan. During the deposition
the following discussion occurred:
"MR. PRATT: I think the record can show that I
have put in the figure 31 and the figure 32, which would
be along what appears to be the general south boundary
of the Morgan property, what is marked as the Morgan
property, the north and larger piece of Morgan property.

''MR. REIMANN: The property which he acquired
from David Burt Affleck?
"MR. PRATT: Yes." (R. 569).
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During the deposition counsel for Grant Morgan also
stated with respect to Exhibit 64-P:
"Let me say this: The plat that we have marked here
as Exhibit 2 is a plat made pursuant to a survey for
Dr. Pendleton and is the one that we would rely on
as showing the correct location of these properties and
the descriptions." (R. 569-5 70) .
Grant Morgan admitted on deposition:

"Q. Well, then according to the plat which has been
prepared by Bush and Gudgell the tract which is described in the complaint does not join onto the tract
which was deeded to you or the two tracts deeded to
you by David Burt Affleck and his wife, isn't that true?
"A. That seems correct." (R. 570).
The appellants claimed "title by adverse possession" at
the trial, but their claims were and are without substance
' for the following reasons: (a) Neither Grant Morgan nor
his wife ever receive~ a deed of conveyance which describes
any portion of the land. (b) The land has never been enclosed
by a fence. (c) Appellants have never had exclusive possession
for a consecutive period of 7 years. (d) Appellants have never
paid any taxes on said land. Exhibits 44-D, 45-D, and 46-D
consist of statements of taxes paid on land descriptions in
the deeds to Grant Morgan, Exhibits 14-D and 15-D. It was
expressly stated that the Morgans did not claim that taxes
were paid on any descriptions except what are contained in
the two deeds. (R. 492-494). Since the deed descriptions
in the deeds to Grant Morgan dated June 2, 1951, and
February 9, 1952, do not cover any portion of the land described in the complaint, Grant Morgan did not prove any
step essential to establish title by adverse possession.
On deposition, Grant Morgan falsely claimed that he
acquired title to the land described in the complaint from
David Burt Affleck. At the trial Grant Morgan asserted that
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he acquired title from his father and "from the Bell boys,"
although ·he received no deed from them covering any part
of the land described in the complaint. (R. 575). His claims
of title were utterly barren of fact or substance.
POINT 2
CONTRARY TO THE ARGUMENTS OF APPELLANTS,
THE COURT DID NOT QUIET TITLE IN GORDON
BURT AFFLECK AND WIFE TO ANY LAND NORTH
OF THE "HANSON SOUTH QUARTER CORNER OF
SECTION 15."
The trial court adjudged that plaintiffs and respondents
Gordon Burt Affleck and wife are owners of the following
described tract of land (R. 78) :
Beginning at a point which is South 8 5° 57' 35"
East 26.83 feet from a cross chiseled on "Contrary
Girl Rock," a survey monument, which cross chiseled
on said "Contrary Girl Rock" has been computed to
be South 85 56' West 691.95 feet from the relocated
North quarter corner of Section 22, Township 1 South,
Range 2 East, Salt Lake Meridian, (which point of
beginning is also the Northwesterly corner of Lot 1
of Merrywood, an unrecorded plat) ; and from said
beginning point running thence East 207.45 feet;
thence North 48.70 feet, more or less, to the North
line of Section 22, Township 1 South, Range 2 East,
Salt Lake Meridian, (said North line of said Section
22 also being the North line of Tract 38 of the Government Resurvey of said Section 22) ; thence west
along the North line of said Section 22 to a point where
the North line of Section 22 is intersected by the easterly boundary line of Mountair Road; thence Southeasterly along the Easterly boundary line of said Mountair Road to the point of beginning.
o

The argument of appellants under Point I of their brief
at pages 8 to 10 that "~he court erred in quieting title in
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respondents to the property north of the Hanson quarter
corner of Section 15,'' is a misstatement of the contents of
the judgment and decree, and a plain distortion of the facts
pertaining to the government surveys. Appellants refrained
from quoting the description contained in the decree for
the reason that to quote it would refute their specious contentions. On page 9 of their brief appellants make the following
assertion which falsely implies that by the conveyance of title
to plaintiffs there was some scheme to push the boundary
over into Section 15: "Apparently in 1957, for the first time
there is a conveyance which attempts to extend the North
line of Section 22 North of the original North line as established by Hanson." There never was any attempt "to extend
the North line of Section 22 North of the original North line
as established by Hanson." Counsel for appellants point to
no language which could possibly have the result which is
charged.
The description of plaintiffs' land as set out in the decree
hereinabove quoted makes no reference to any "Hanson line."
As counsel for appellants should know, the section line run
by A. P. Hanson as the south line of Section 15 and north
line of Section 22 was not the original line at all, for the
original line was established on the Ferron survey in 1891.
Said Hanson line which appellants improperly designate as
the "original line" was a resurvey line according to the express
declarations of Hanson himself. Instead of being located
south of the north line of Section 22 established and marked
on the Government Resurvey of Sections 22 and 23 in 1927
as appellants seek to induce this Honorable Court to believe,
the Hanson resurvey line was approximately 561 feet north
of the original Ferron south line of Section 15. The Ferron
line was retraced and reestablished on the Government Resurvey
in 1927.
The falsity of the argument of appellants is illustrated
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by Exhibit 35-P, which is a plat prep(lred by Jean R. Driggs,
Sr. Said exhibit shows the relative location and position on
the ground (a) of the south line of Section 15 as surveyed by
A. D. Ferron in 1891, (b) the survey of Section 22 by A. P.
Hanson in 1902, and (c) the Government Resurvey of Section
22 in 1927. Appellants' engineers did not dispute the correctness of Exhibit 35-P. When confronted with the statements
contained in the field notes, Mr. Gudgell admitted that Hanson's
resurvey line of the north line of Section 22 appears to have
been located about 8.5 chains (561 feet) north of the Ferron
south line of Section 15. (R. 286). The excuse A. P. Hanson
gave on July 8, 1902, for resurveying the south line of Section
15 and north line of Section 22 which previously had been
established on the Ferron survey of 1891 was "Being unable
to find any trace of the cor. of sees. 15, 16, 21 and 22 upon
which to close my survey." (Exhibit 33-P, Book A-292, page
373).
The excuse given by Hanson for his resurvey line was
untenable, for he could have found the corner set by Ferron
in 1891 to mark the corner to Sections 15, 16, 21 and 22, if
he had taken the trouble to look for it at the location described
by Ferron. Exhibit 32-P covers a portion of the Ferron field
notes in Book A-228, page 102: "80.00 (chains) On line in
place marked a stationary boulder 4 x 4 x 2 feet above ground
with a cross (X) and 3 notches on S. & E. edges and raised
a stone mound 1lf2 ft. high, 2 ft. base alongside for cor. to
Sees. 15, 16, 21 & 22." As shown by Exhibit 5-P, the J. H.
Evers survey in 1901 of Old Arm Chair subdivision in the
southwest quarter of Section 15 showed the southwest corner
of Section 15 to be a "Stationary Ledge marked with X & 3
notches East & South sides." The terms .. stake #31" and .. stake
#32" in the deed descriptions Exhibits 14-D and 15-D originated in the Old Arm Chair survey, and are indicated on
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Exhibit 5-P. Apparently J. H. Evers in 1901 had no difficulty
in finding the Ferron corner of Sections 15, 16, 21 and 22.
Howard W. Miller, the U.S. Cadastral Engineer, executed
the Government Resurvey of Sections 22 and 23 in 1926 and
1927, Exhibits 6-P and 34-P. He had no difficulty in finding
the original Ferron corner of Sections 15, 16, 21 and 22 in
1927. As shown in his field notes, Exhibit 34-P, (Book A-491,
page 399) in retracing the section line as established by A. D.
Ferron, from the reestablished corner of Sections 14, 15, 22
and 23, Mr. Miller ran the line South 89 ° 39' West 80.02
chains to "The original Ferron cor. of sees. 15, 16, 21 and 22,
which is a red sandstone boulder or outcropping, 4 ft. high
and 4 ft. wide, facing SE., the top of which is marked with
a cross, with 3 grooves E. and 3 grooves S. of cross, and
witnessed by a scattered mound of stone. This cor. monument
is in a good state of preservation." By the Government Resurvey of 1927 the Hanson resurveyed "south line of Section
15 and north line of Section 22" was superseded and terminated.
The contention of appellants on page 10 of their brief
that "the Court erred in quieting title in the respondents to
anything North of the original North section line of the
Hanson Survey," is patently absurd. In the first place, the
Hanson north line was not the original section line, but an
invalid resurvey line. In making a resurvey it is the duty of
the engineer to reestablish the line where it was originally
located. See Henrie v. Hyer, 92 Utah 530, 70 P.2d 154. A. P.
Hanson paid no attention to the location of the original Ferron
South line of Section 15, which was the original north line of
Section 22. Hanson arbitrarily set a new corner 561 feet north
and west of the Ferron corner, which was a "limestone 17
x 7 x 5 ins. 12 ins. in the ground for cor. of sees. 15, 16, 21
and 22 marked 1 Son N. E., 2 EonS. E. faces with 3 notches
on S. and E. edges." (Book A-292, page 373, Exhibit 33-P).
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Mr. Hanson surveyed Section 22 with an acreage of 696.98
acres or nearly 57 acres in excess of a standard section. Since
he ran his resurvey line about 561 feet north of the Ferron
south line of Section 15, about 70 acres of Section 22 as surveyed by Hanson overlapped onto Section 15 as Section 15
had been surveyed by A. D. Ferron.
The supplemental group instructions, Group 160, Utah,
dated February 27, 1926, in the office of Cadastral Engineer,
specified:
"These supplemental special instructions provide
reestablishment of the south boundary of Sections 13
to 18 inclusive, Township 1 South, Range 2 East,
surveyed by A. D. Ferron, also an independent resurvey
of the areas of this township by A. P. Hanson in 1902,
plat approved 1903." (R. 328).
On page 7 of the supplemental instruments for the Government Resurvey commenced in 1926 it is stated:
''The third latitudinal section line selected as the
limiting north boundary for these resurveys was surveyed generally as an offset line by A. D. Ferron in
1891. A. P. Hanson claims to have resurveyed this
line in 1902, but his surveys appear to be spurious and
his record may be entirely disregarded. As a result of
the investigation, it is believed that the original Ferron
corner of Sections 15, 16, 21 and 22 is the only original
corner along this line." (R. 328).
The Government Resurvey of Sections 22 and 23 in
192 7 tied that survey to the existing corners of the Hanson
Survey of 1902 as well as to the existing corners of the Ferron
survey of 1891. The Government Resurvey of 1927 terminated
the overlap of the Hanson survey of Section 22 onto the south
561 feet of Section 15. There can be no question about the
fact that Hanson's survey of Section 22 extended about 561
feet north over onto Section 15. The distance from the East
quarter corner of Section 22 north to the alleged closing corner
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of Section 14 clearly shows that overlap into Section 15. The
same is true with respect to the west boundary of Section
22 as surveyed by Hanson. From his resurvey line Hanson
said he went south 21.30 chains to the creek. The distance
to the creek south of the Ferron corner of Sections 15, 16, 21
and 22 is only 16.15 chains, although the creek is intersected
at a point farther to the southwest as illustrated on Exhibit
35-P.

The topography described in the Hanson field notes on
his resurvey of the south line of Section 15, does not fit the
topography described on the Government Resurvey in 1927.
From the East quarter corner of Section 22 as set by A. P.
Hanson in 1902 (which corner is still in place and was marked
as an angle point of Tract 37 of the Government Resurvey
of 1927), Hanson went North 0° 21' West 45.72 chains
instead of 40 chains to "Intersect E. and W. line 2.66 chs.
N. 89° 57' E. of cor. of sees. 14, 15, 22 and 23 as reestablished
by me July 2, 1902, and described under resurveys, subdivision
of this Tp. Book S." (Exhibit 33-P, Book A-292, page 339).
Hanson states that he set a sandstone 18 x 8 x 5 inches at that
point for a closing corner of Sections 22 and 23. He then
went back 45.72 chains where he "Set a quartzite stone 17 x
8 x 6 ins. 12 ins. in the ground for IA sec. cor. marked JA on
W. face; raised a mound of stone 2 ft. base 11;2 ft. high W.
of cor." The Hanson east line of Section 22 was 5.72 chains
in excess of a mile.
The west line of Section 22 as resurveyed in 1927 was
only 77.26 chains in length as compared with 87.18 chains
as the length of the Hanson west line of Section 22 as surveyed
in 1902. The Hanson west line was 9.92 chains longer than
the 1927 Government Resurvey west line. However, the
south line of the Hanson survey of Section 22 was found to
be 1.42 chains south of the south line of Section 22 as resurveyed in 1927. By subtracting 1.42 chains from 9.92 chains
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we get a difference of 8.5 chains ( 561 feet) as the length of
the Hanson west line of Seeton 22 which extended n·orth of
the north line of Section 22 as reestablished on the 1927
Government Resurvey.
The east line of Section 22 as resurveyed in 1927 was
only 77.80 chains as compared with 85.72 chains as the length
of the Hanson east line of said section. The offset of 1.42
chains cancel each other. The difference of 7.92 chains or
521.62 feet is the distance which the Hanson relocated southeast corner of Section 15 is north of the 1927 reestablished
corner of Sections 14, 15, 22 and 23. At the east the Hanson
"resurvey" line was 521.62 feet north and at the west was 561
feet north of the north line of Section 22 as reestablished on
the Government Resurvey in 1927. The northwest corner of
Section 22 as established on the Government Resurvey in 1927
was and is the original Ferron corner established in 1891.
That fact is conclusive in the record.
The plat in the back of this brief is a copy of Exhibit
35-P with additional data from field notes and from the record
on appeal superimposed in red ink. Said plat illustrates the
position of the survey lines, location of survey monuments,
and the relative location of the controverted deed descriptions.
An examination of this plat and of the metes and bounds
description of the tract of land to which the court quieted
title discloses that there is no possible basis for the argument
that the trial court quieted title to any land north of the
"Hanson South quarter corner of Section 15." As illustrated
by the field notes under Point 3 of this brief, Hanson never
claimed that he set the south quarter corner of Section 15.
Furthermore, the description of land in· the decree makes the
north line of said tract to which title is quieted in Gordon
Burt Affleck and wife, the north line of Section 22 as reestablished during the Government Resurvey of 1927. The
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north line of the land described in the decree is not north
but about 550 feet south of the one-time Hanson north line
of Section 22. The Hanson line was pronounced "spurious"
by the General Land Office after a thorough investigation.
Said Hanson north line of Section 22 was superseded and
terminated by the 1927 Government Resurvey of Section 22
and 23. The 1927 resurvey reestablished the original Ferron
section line. Said Hanson "resurvey section line" has not had
any existence since 1927.
In attempting to put the one-time Hanson south line of
Section 15 (north line of Section 22) south of the north line
of Section 22 as reestablished on the 1927 Government Resurvey, appellants indulge in a highly misleading argument.
Appellants seek to create the impression that the Hanson
north line of Section 22 was the original north line of said
section, notwithstanding the fact that Hanson himself stated
in his field notes, Exhibit 33-P, that it was a "resurvey line."
Appellants falsely contend that the "Hanson south quarter
corner of Section 15" was located approximately 22 feet south
of the north line of Section 22 as reestablished on the 1927
Government Resurvey. The inexorable fact is that Hanson
never set the south quarter corner of Section 15, and he stated
in his field notes that he set the north quarter corner of Section
22 on his resurvey line, which position was 561 feet north
and approximately 2800 feet east of the original Ferron corner
of Sections 15, 16, 21 and 22.
On page 8 of their brief the Morgans make the unique
but absurd contention that by having a plat made of the
Merrywood subdivision in Section 22 in 1910, Alvaro A.
Pratt as patentee "established at that time the North quarter
corner of Section 22, i.e., the Northeast corner of Lot 3 and
the Northwest corner of Lot 2 of said section at a point 87° 50'
East 822.8 feet from Contrary Girl Rock. This was 33 feet
North of the North line of the Merrywood Subdivision. (Ex.
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P-11." Such argument concedes that the respondents Gordon
Burt Affleck and wife own a tract of land at least 33 feet in
width. However, neither Alvaro A. Pratt nor any one else
could legally move the section line south 22 feet (or north)
by a private survey. Alvaro A. Pratt did not attempt to move
the section line, but he could not have succeeded even if he
had tried. As far as the lots in the unrecorded Merrywood
subdivision were concerned, it would make no difference
where any government corner might be located, for all of
these lots were tied directly to a cross chiseled on a large
survey monument known as .. Contrary Girl Rock." (Exhibit
11-P).
On page 14 of their brief appellants attempt to make it
appear that the plaintiffs and their predecessors assumed or
believed that the tract of land between the north line of Lots
1 and 2 of Merrywood and the north line of Section 22 was
only 33 feet in width, and that plaintiffs having had a mistaken
assumption should not be permitted to claim to the section
line where it originally existed because the surveyor who
prepared the Merrywood plat thought that the distance was
only 33 feet. Counsel for appellants do not make clear how
a mistaken belief or erroneous assumption of a property
owner can move a section line north, south, east, west or in
any other direction from where it was originally established.
The appellants ignore the correction deed given to Gordon
Burt Affleck and wife, and the explantaion counsel for the
Morgans drew out of him as the reason for the correction
deed. (R. 624).
Counsel misconstrue the original deed to the plaintiffs
dated Septerpber 3, 1955, in an effort to narrow the tract to
33 feet. That deed description starts on the north line of
Section 22. It is elementary that the call of .. South 33 feet
to the Northeasterly corner of said Lot 2 of Merrywood"
conveyed the entire strip between the north line of Section 22
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and the north line of Lots 1 and 2 of Merrywood. (Exhibit
2-P). If counsel for appellants were correct in arguing that
the north line of Lot 3 of Section 22 necessarily refers to the
Hanson survey, then instead of conveying only the strip of
ground described in the decree or between the existing section
line and the north lines of Lots 1 and 2 of Merrywood, such
deed would have purportedly conveyed a tract of land nearly
597 feet in width, for the reason that the Hanson north line
of Section 22 was about 550 feet north of the tract described
in the decree and the tract described in the decree is 48.7 feet
in width at the east.
Counsel for appellants infer that the deed from Alvaro
A. Pratt did not cover all of the land to the north line of
Section 22 as said section line is presently established. On the
contrary, such conveyance went north of the present section
line because the north lines of Lots 2, 3 and 4 of Section 22
were on the Hanson's north line of Section 22. The Hanson
line was considerably in excess of 500 feet farther north than
the presently existing section line. The abstract of title, Exhibit
1-P, pages 28 to 30, clearly shows that Alvaro A. Pratt and
wife conveyed to Parker B. Pratt all of "Lots 2, 3 and 4,
Section 22, Township 1 South, Range 2 East, Salt Lake Meridian, excepting the following tract or parcels, to-wit"; and the
exceptions cover only metes and bounds descriptions of Lots
1 to 7, 20, 32 and 34 of Merrywood, which exceptions do not
cover any of the land described in the complaint. The argument
that the north boundary of the Pratt lands in Section 22 was
south of the north line of Section 22 as reestablished on the
Government Resurvey in 1927 is palpably absurd. According
to the Hanson survey, Lots 2, 3 and 4 of Section 22 overlapped
into Section 15 from 521.62 feet to 561 feet.
Contrary to the contradictory arguments of the Morgans,
the court did not quiet title "to anything North of the original
North section line of the Hanson Survey," for the reason that
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the north line of the Hanson survey was a "resurvey line" (not
the original section line) which was from 521.62 feet to as
much as 561 feet north of the presently existing section line
as reestablished in the Government Resurvey in 1927. The
1917 resurvey reestablished the section line where it was
originally established by A. D. Ferron in 1891. The original
Ferron northwest corner of Section 22 was found in a good
state of preservation. The 1927 resurveyed section line had to
be anchored to that original monument.

POINT 3
APPELLANTS HAVE NO CAPACITY TO IMPEACH
THE 1927 GOVERNMENT RESURVEY OF SECTION 22.
THERE IS NO MERIT TO THE ARGUMENT THAT "THE
COURT ERRED IN BASING TITLE UPON THE RESURVEY.''
Appellants attempt to create title confusion by an unwarranted attempt to impeach the official Government Resurvey
in 1927 of the south line of Section 15 and north line of
Section 22. Counsel do not and cannot point out in any particular wherein the 1927 survey executed by Howard W.
Miller, U. S. Cadastral Engineer, was in error. In their
argument, appellants ignore the fact that the original corner
of Sections 14, 15, 21 and 22 and the original corner of
Sections 14, 15, 22 and 23 were established in 1891 on the
survey executed by A. D. Ferron. The Morgans and their
witnesses repeatedly referred to a non-existent monument
which was officially destroyed by the United States Government
during the resurvey in 1927, as the ..old original corner" and
as the "original Hanson corner," when there is no evidence
that such rock was ever identified with any of the United
States surveys. Contrary to the arguments of counsel for
appellants, there is no evidence that A. P. Hanson in 1902
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established his north quarter corner of Section 22 at any point
other than where he stated in his .field notes that he established
it, which point was 37.38 chains west on his resurvey line from
his "relocated" southeast corner of Section 15. Hanson never
set the south quarter corner of Section 15.
It is not disputed that the Government Resurvey of 1927
of Section 22 was an official survey of the United States, nor
that its purpose was to retrace the original Ferron south line of
Section 15, etc. As stated in Knight v. United Land Association.
142 U. S. 173, 35 L. Ed. 974, 979, 12 S. Ct. 259, with respect
to government resurveys:

"It is a well settled rule of law that the power to
make and correct surveys of the public lands belongs
exclusively to the political department of government,
and that the action of that department, within the scope
of its authority, is unassailable in the courts except by
a direct proceeding . . . ''
In Henrie v. Hyer, 92 Utah 530, 70 P. 2d 154 at 157, this
Court said:
" ... Official surveys for the United States government are not open to attack between private parties
in disputes over boundary lines."
In Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Dudley, 105 Utah 208,
141 P. 2d 160, the following rule was stated:
"A survey monument relocated by proper authority
is presumed to be placed where the surveyor originally
located it, until and unless the contrary is shown by
competent evidence."
There can be no question about the fact that on the
Government Resurvey of 1927, the U. S. Cadastral Engineer
retraced the south line of Section 15 and north line of Section
22 as that land was established originally by A. D. Ferron
in 1891. The 1927 Government Resurvey superseded the
Hanson .. resurvey." The Ferron corner common to Sections
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15, 16, 21 and 22 was found in a good state of preservation,
being an outcropping or boulder of red standstone 4 feet
high and 4 feet long and 2 feet thick, marked with a cross, and
3 grooves on the south and east sides.
As shown by the field notes of the 1927 resurvey, "The
original.1,4 sec. cor. bet. sees. 14 and 15 is a red standstone,
16 x 10 x 6 ins., lying on the ground, marked 1h on one face,
and witnessedby deeply embedded stones around cor. I reset
stone 10 ins. in the ground marked 1,4 on W. face, and alongside same, set an iron post, 3 feet long, 1 in. in dia., 28 ins.
in the ground for 1,4 sec. cor., with brass cap marked . . . "
(Exhibit 34-P, Book A-491 page 393). After determining
that the east line of Section 15 had a bearing of South 0 ° 40'
East, the engineers chained on that course 40 chains to a point
where they reestablished the corner of Sections 14, 15, 22
and 23, marked with an iron post 2 inches in diameter with
a brass cap. (Book A-491, page 394). The reestablished
corner of Sections 14, 15, 22 and 23 is 80.02 chains North
89 ° 39' East from the original Ferron corner of Sections 15,
16, 21 and 22.
During the Government Resurvey of Sections 22 and 23
m 1927, the U. S. Cadastral Engineer found at a point 1.97
chains (130.02 feet) east and 2links (1.32 feet) south of the
reestablished corner of Sections 14, 15, 22 and 23, "a sandstone, 10 x 12 x 12 ins. above ground, firmly set, marked
with 3 notches on E., 3 notches on W. and 2 notches on S.
edge;" from which he found certain "bearing trees" (B. T.)
referring to such monument. He stated: "The above stone
and bearing trees, while marked for the cor. of sees. 14, 15,
22 and 23, cannot be identified as belonging to either the
Ferron or Hanson survey systems in this township; therefore,
I conclude that it is of local origin and destroy the stone
and deface the bearing trees." (Book A-491, pages 396-397).
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On page 12 of their brief appellants attempt to make
a big play over an error in the 1927 field notes in referring
to a fictitious monument which was destroyed during the
resurvey of 1927 as the "Hanson :LA sec. cor." Appellants
argue:
" . . . It is also clear that in making this relocation,
Miller definitely pinpointed and recognized the existence of the Hanson South Quarter corner of Section
15, stating:
" 'South, 34 lks. distant is the Hanson IA, sec.
cor. So. boundary Sec. 15, which is a red standstone
10 x 12 x 4 ins. above ground, firmly set, marked
IA, on N. face; no accessories to cor. I destroy this
cor.' (Ex. P. 34, at p. 60 thereof).
"This location is further tied to the Hanson survey
plat (Ex. D-21) according to Mr. Gudgell's testimony above referred to . . . ''
Contrary to such argument such location was not tied to
anything in the Hanson field notes nor to the Hanson survey
plat, nor even mentioned in the Hanson field notes. While
the surveyor erroneously referred to such destroyed monument
as a "Hanson IA, cor.'', the field notes of the Government Resurvey of 1927 and the Hanson field notes of 1902 clearly
demonstrate that such destroyed "corner" was not set by
Hanson. Hanson made no pretense that he ever set the south
quarter corner of Section 15. As stated in Exhibit 34- P, Book
A-491, page 481, field note of the Government Resurvey of
1927:
" ... No evidence of the Hanson surveys of the N.
Bdy. of sec. 22 can be found and his reported closings
upon the former surveys in this vicinity are notoriously
fictitious. Indications are that land owners have used
the Ferron cor. of sees. 15, 16, 21 and 22 to locate their
claims and ran in cardinal directions therefrom. Therefore, the N. bdy. of the Hanson survey of sec. 22 is
terminated on the reestablished S. bdy. of sees. 14 and
15."
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We have heretofore pointed out under Point 2 of this
brief that the Hanson north line of Section 22 (south line
of Section 15) was an unauthorized resurvey line and that
his relocated southwest corner of Section 15 was placed at
a point 561 feet north (and west) of the Ferron corner.
Hanson's relocated southeast corner of Section 15 was at a
point 521.62 feet north of the corner of Sections 14, 15, 22
and 23 as reestablished on the 1927 Government Resurvey.
It is significant that in his field notes Hanson did not describe
any terrain which fits the south line of Section 15 as reestablished on the 1927 Government Resurvey. From his
"relocated" southeast corner of Section 15, Mr. Hanson said
he ran his resurvey line west. At 34.25 chains he said "Top
of spur runs S. 90 ft. high," which cannot be identified with
anything in the vicinity of the reestablished section line. At
37.38 chains west of his relocated southeast corner of Section
15, Mr. Hanson
"Set a sandstone 18 x 8 x 4 ins. 12 ins. in the ground
for 1;4 cor. of sec. 22 marked 1;4 of S face; raised a
mound of stones 2 ft. base 11h ft. high S of cor."
(Exhibit 33-P, Book A-292, page 347).
It is significant that on his resurvey line Hanson said
that he set the north quarter for Section 22, but he did not
set the south quarter corner for Section 15. Hanson offset
Section 22 from Section 15. The south quarter corner would
be the southwest corner of the southeast quarter of Section
15. To set the south quarter corner of Section 15 Hanson
would have had to set it approximately 41 chains west from
his relocated southeast corner of Section 15, because his
resurvey line was 82.02 chains instead of 80 chains in length.
However, he only set the north quarter corner of Section 22.
Reference to the stone monument which was destroyed in
1927 as the "Hanson 1,4 sec. cor. So. boundary Sec. 15" was
and is erroneous for the reason that Hanson never set a
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quarter corner for the South quarter corner of Section 15,
and such destroyed stone cannot be identified with the Hanson
survey or any other government authorized survey.
It should be noted that there were accessories to the
North quarter corner of Section 22 which Hanson set in 1902,
consisting of a mound of rocks 2 feet at the base. There were
no accessories to the rock monument which was found in
1927. Furthermore, Hanson marked his monument with "lt4"
on the south face, which would be proper. The rock which
was destroyed in 1927 which appellants have improperly
referred to as the "original Hanson corner" ana as the "original
corner," was marked "lt4" on the north face. Consequently,
such rock was not in the place nor position where Hanson
said he set his quarter corner. According to the field notes
of Hanson as platted on Exhibit 35-P, the Hanson north
quarter corner of Section 22 was set at a point which is about
560 feet northerly from the place where the rock monument
was found in 1927 which was destroyed.
Perhaps the most decisive proof that the destroyed monument was not the Hanson quarter corner is the fact that they
were of different sizes and dimensions. The rock which was
destroyed in 1927 was a red standstone 10 x 12 x 4 inches
above the ground. The North quarter corner of Section 22
set by Hanson in 1902 was 18 x 8 x 4 inches above the ground.
It is conceivable that a rock monument might diminish in
size by erosion, but it is not conceivable that one of its dimensions will increase in size with age. Thus, the two monuments
were different in size. One was marked JA on the north face
and the other was marked JA on the south face. The monument
set by Hanson had accessories consisting of a mound of stones.
The monument which was destroyed had no accessories whatsoever. The rock which was destroyed in 1927 was found in
a location which was about 560 feet southerly from the place
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where Hanson stated in his field notes that he set his north
quarter corner of Section 22.
On the Government Resurvey of the section line in 1927
in going west from the reestablished corner of Sections 14,
15, 22 and 23, the surveyors reached the Mountair Road at
50.60 chains. (Book A-491, page 399). On Hanson's resurvey
line, west from his relocated southeast corner of Section 15,
he reached the road ."in bottom of gulch" at 66.15 chains.
Hanson in July, 1902, reached the road 1026.30 feet farther
to the west than did ·the U. S. Cadastral Engineer in 1927
for the reason that Hanson's resurvey line was about 561 feet
farther north, and the road winds to the northwest. To further
demonstrate that Hanson's resurvey line was some distance
over into Section 15, all one needs to do is to look at his
survey plat, which shows the road running through Lot 4
of Section 22. It is undisputed that there is no road through
what was formerly known as Lot 4 of Section 22. By an invalid
resurvey, Hanson arbitrarily tried to annex about 70 acres of
Section 15 to add to Section 22 to make Section 22 an oversize section.
Mr. Gudgell repeatedly referred to the rock monument
which was destroyed in 1927 as the "old original corner,"
and as the "Hanson corner," but he admitted that he did
not know who set it. He said, "I am not saying that the old
original corner was set by Hanson. I don't know who it was
set by.'' (R. 259). Mr. Gudgell recognized that what he called
the "Hanson corner" did not correspond with the quarter
corner which Hanson stated in his field notes that he had
established. (R. 273). He also said, "I am not saying that
quarter corner was Hanson's or was Ferron's." (R. 284).
Neither Ferron nor Hansen ever set the south quarter of Section
15. The south quarter corner of Section 15 was never established until 1927 when it was established on the Government
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Resurvey. It is known as the relocated or reestablished 1\Iorth
quarter corner of Section 22 and also as the South quarter
corner of Section 15.
The monument which was found in 1927 south of the
section line with a 1)! marked on the north face was never
established on any government survey. It was not an official
monument, and it was properly destroyed. In this connection
it is interesting to note that appellants do not complain of
the destruction of the monument which was only 1.32 feet
south of the reestablished section line between Sections 14
and 23. Only two monuments were destroyed on said 1927
survey. The Hanson east quarter corner of Section 22 was
not destroyed. It was marked by an angle point and tied to
the relocated east quarter corner of Section 22. The Cadastral
Engineer did not destroy any monument which was set where
the field notes stated that it was set, nor if it could be identified
with any prior government survey.
Appellants argue that the section line was pushed farther
to the north by the Government Resurvey in 1927. In connection
with their unfounded argument they cite United States v.
State Investment Co., 264 U. S. 204, and New Mexico v.
Colorado, 267 U. S. 30. We fully agree with the doctrine
set forth in those cases. The difficulty is that appellants have
the facts in reverse. If the section line was "moved" it was
not movea north but south to where it was located in 1891.
Consequently, those cases cannot possibly assist the Morgans.
Those cases might be applicable to assail the invalid Hanson
resurvey of the north line of Section 22 in 1902, since Hanson
disregarded the original section line as surveyed by Ferron
in 1891 when Hanson attempted to slice off from 561 feet
to 521.62 feet from the south side of Section 15 and include
that area of about 70 acres in Section 22. The 1927 Government Resurvey remedied the unlawful overlap. In defiance
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of the facts appellants have tried to make it appear that the
Hanson north line of Section 22 was south of the north line
of Section 22 as reestablished on the Government Resurvey
in 1927 when the Hanson line was from 521.62 to 561 feet
north of the reestablished section line. The 1927 Government
Survey of Section 22 was anchored to the original Ferron
corner of Sections 15, 16, 21 and 22. The 1927 resurvey was
accurate!y executed in accordancewith the rules established
by law.
On pages 11 and 12 of their brief, the Morgans quote
from Henrie v. Hyer, 92 Utah 530, 70 P. 2d 154. We fully
concur iri that quotation. The Government Resurvey of 1927
fully complied with that rule. The original corner of Sections
15, 16, 21 and 22 established in 1891 by Ferron was found
in 1927 in a good state of preservation, although Hanson
represented that he could not find it. The resurvey was accurate! y executed according to law and according to the rules
established nearly a century ago. The incompetent Hanson
resurvey of the south line of Section 15, which was made in
utter disergard of the rules, was terminated and superseded
by the 1927 resurvey.
The arguments of appellants, if adopted would create
insurmountable confusion in the law, and place in peril every
title in Section 15. On page 14 of their brief counsel for the
Morgans say:
''The Court should give recognition to the property
descriptions and to the conveyances based upon the
descriptions emanating from the North Quarter corner
of Section 22, as established by Mr. Hanson. To do
otherwise is error."
Counsel for the Morgans seem to overlook the fact that
none of the property descriptions in Section 15 ever were tied
to any known or assumed monument of the Hanson survey.
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All property descriptions of land in Section 15 were tied either
to the northwest corner of Section 15 or to the southwest
corner of Section 15 as that section was surveyed by A. D.
Ferron in 1891. Inasumch as the Hanson north quarter
corner of Seeton 22 was located at a point which was 561 feet
north and about 2800 feet east of the Ferron southwest corner
of Section 15, if the argument of counsel for appellants were
taken seriously, the Morgans did not get any title to any land
in Section 15 by either of the two deeds from David Burt
Affleck and wife, Exhibits 14-D and 15-D, for those property
descriptions are not only north of the original Ferron section
line, but they are within the strip of land 521.62 feet to 561
feet in width which Hanson tried to lop off of Section 15
and include in Section 15 by his incompetent .. resurvey" in
1902.

POINT 4
THE CONTENTION THAT "THE DECISION OF THE
COURT IS INEQUITABLE IN REFUSING TO RECOGNIZE
REASONABLE ENJOYMENT OF THE LAND SURROUNDING THE BURT AFFLECK HOME," DISREGARDS
BOTH THE FACTS AND THE LAW.

It is admitted that a suit to quiet title is equitable in nature.
However, the plaintiffs sued in ejectment to recover damages
for trespass. There can be no valid dispute of plaintiffs'
record title. What defendants did to plaintiff was not "equitable." The defendant Grant Morgan acquired Lots 1 and 2
of Merrywood on the south side of plaintiffs' land. In 1951
he bought the land in Section 15 owned by David Burt Affleck.
Sometime later Grant Morgan arbitrarily decided to .. take
over" the land of plaintiffs and of a third party which lies
in between. There are absolutely no equities in favor of the
Morgans.
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The case of Mayer v. Flynn, 46 Utah 598, 150 P. 692,
does not support the Morgan claims. That case involved conflicting conveyances. In this case Morgan never acquired any title to
the land described in the complaint. In the Mayer case the eaves
of defendant's house protruded over the boundary, and
it was held that defendant was required to cut off those overhanging eaves. Yet, there was some evidence that defendant
sought to avoid encroachment. This Honorable Court said
in that case:
" . . . Of course, where the boundaries described in
the title papers are tied to reliable and fixed monuments, so that such boundaries can with certainty be
located on the ground, one may not go beyond such
boundaries and hope to escape from being required to
undo what he has done under the plea that it was done
in good faith and by mistake. The invasion of another's property rights in law, if not in morals, constitutes a trespass, and the trespasser is civilly liable,
whether it occurred in good faith under mistake of
fact or law or otherwise ... " ( 46 Utah 607).
It is possible that David Burt Affleck in building a house
m 1935, half of which extended over onto the Pratt land,
was misled by the abortive survey made by H. G. Hall in
1931 which utterly disregarded the deed descriptions. However, it should be remembered that in 1951 Grant Morgan
did not have any negotiations with David Burt Affleck.
Affleck wanted to sell his property for $7,500. For some
reason Grant Morgan did not want to deal directly with
Affleck. Morgan had his real estate broker communicate an
offer of $4,500. The deed which the broker had David Burt
Affleck and wife sign on June 2, 1951, described a tract land
in Section 15, but it did not mention any house. That deed,
Exhibit 14-D, only conveyed that portion of the house which
stands on that tract of land. On February 9, 1952, Morgan's
broker told David Burt Affleck that part of the land had
been omitted from the deed and upon request the said Afflecks
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executed the deed, Exhibit 15-D. There were no representations made at any time to Grant Morgan by the Afflecks as
to what they owned.
In view of what Grant Morgan knew, he could not have
been expected to pay David Burt Affleck much more than
$4,500 for the Affleck property. Morgan could readily see
that the house built some years previously by David Burt
Affleck extended over onto lands Affleck did not own. Morgan
admitted that in 1948 he was advised by Dr. Ralph Pendleton
that the Reimanns had bought out the Parker B. Pratt estate
lands in Section 22. (R. 580). Morgan admitted that he had
negotiations with Paul E. Reimann and Dr. Pendleton for
the possible acquisition of a strip of land 16Ij2 feet in width
on the north side of Lots 1 and 2 of Merrywood. (R. 580582, 585-587).
The plaintiff Gordon Burt Affleck testified that in 1950
in the vicinity of the north line of Lot 1 of Merrywood there
was a conversation between Affleck, Morgan and Reimann.
The conversation related to a proposed "sale of 361;2 feet
with 161;2 to Mr. Morgan." Affleck asked Reimann to protect
his brother David Burt Affleck with 16Y2 feet. Reimann
told Morgan that he would not protect him nor anyone else
unless he obeyed the covenants if there was a septic tank.
Morgan said he would like to have the 161;2 feet, and said
"I hoped you could work out a deal." Referring to David
Burt Affleck, Reimann said to Gordon Burt Affleck, "I can't
take care of him because he hadn't paid assessments." Affleck
said "Burt was pretty sore because the assessments had been
abated while he was in the army." As Affleck left the conference to go back to the house, he said he wanted that property
and had from the beginning. He told Reimann, "You must
preserve it for my mother and father, that is all I want you
to do." Affleck also said to Reimann in the presence of
Morgan that if they could not get together on their exchange,

41
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Affleck wanted Reimann to protect him on the piece of property
he wanted from the beginning, and he wanted a right-of-way
to his mother and father protected. (R. 661-664).
Grant Morgan· never at any time purchased the portion of
the house which stands on the property described in the complaint and in the decree. He did not purchase the fish pond,
the trees, shrubs, stream, pipeline or pumphouse. The trial
court awarded to Grant Morgan even the portion of the
house and pumphouse and pipeline which are on the land
described in the complaint which Morgan never built nor
bought nor paid for, and granted an easement on the land
where such structures are located. Counsel for the Morgans
says such easement "is not consistent with the facts as developed
in the evidence, and certainly does no equity for appellants."
We agree that there is no basis for the award of any easement to the Morgans for reasons hereinafter stated on argument of the cross-appeal. The trial court should have required
the Morgans to move the house off the land, since the court
awarded the Morgans the portion of the house they did not
buy.
Appellants complain because they say they need the use
of the land around the house and the trees, the stream, the
fish pond and other things which the Morgans want but never
bought, in order to enjoy the portion of the house which
they never bought. The Morgans make the novel but specious
argument that those facilities on property which they do not
own constitute appurtenances to the adjoining property although none of those items are described in deeds to adjoining
property. It is elementary that a house is a "fixture," not an
appurtenance. Grant Morgan decided in 1951 or thereafter
that by owning the properties on both sides, those properties
could better be used as a "unit" by having the property belonging to plaintiffs which is in the middle. Consequently, the
Morgans say they should be awarded the permanent use of
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the lands of the plaintiffs because of the admitted trespasses
of the Morgans, and in effect deprive the plaintiffs of all use
and value of property which plaintiffs purchased and leave
nothing for the plaintiffs except the duty to pay the taxes.
Appellants also contradict the record by pretending that
·'these improvements were being constructed throughout the
years with the knowledge of Paul Reimann and Gordon Burt
Affleck." There is no such evidence. Gordon Burt Affleck
was not aware until 1954 that Grant Morgan was making any
alleged "improvements." The view from the road was obscured
by brush. The cross-examination of Walter K. Fahr, who
helped Grant Morgan, shows that Morgan and Fahr were
diverting attention of Reimann from what was occurring on
the land in question by trespassing on his lands farther up
the canyon, by damming up the creek, although they represented to Reimann that they were trying to help him protect
his property against trespassers who were turning out the water
and washing out the road. Fahr admitted that Reimann ordered
both Fahr and Morgan to get off his land in 1955, which most
certainly could not be construed to constitute an approval of
the trespasses. (R. 649-652).
The alleged "complete unitization of this tract of land
in connection with the summer home site" is a myth. The
following comment on page 17 is rather impudent: "One cannot help being impressed with the inequity which is now
placed upon the appellants by allowing Mr. Reimann and
Gordon Burt Affleck to come in with a title originating in
1957, to obtain this land as a wedge between the two homes
of the appellants." The title did not originate in 1957. It
It originated with the United States patent. Obviously,
Grant Morgan with knowledge of the fact that he did not
own the land described in the complaint decided that he could
squeeze out the plaintiffs by owning land on both sides. His
conduct is utterly unconscionable. He is not in any position
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to talk about "equity." The trial court was far too liberal with
him.

POINT 5
THERE IS NO MERIT TO THE ARGUMENT THAT
"THE COURT ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING APPELLANTS THE OPPORTUNITY OF CLAIMING RECOVERY FOR IMPROVEMENTS TO THE LAND."
In order for a defendant to be entitled to any judicial
relief under the occupying claimants' statute, Section 57-6-4,
U.C.A. 1953, he must satisfy each of the following requirements: (a) He must show "color of title" to the real estate
on which the ·improvements are located. (b) He must prove
that he constructed the improvements in good faith, honestly
believeing that he had title when making the improvements.
Day v.JonesJ 112 Utah 286, 187 P. 2d 181, and Doyle v. West
Temple Terrace Co.J 47 Utah 238, 152 P. 1180. (c) The
claimant must prove that he rected the improvements wholly
on the land on which his "color of title" has been adjudicated
adversely. As stated in Uthoff v. Thompson} 176 La. 599,
146 So. 161, the improvements for which recovery is sought
"must be on the land of the one from whom reimbursement
is demanded, and not wholly or partially on the land of another."
Neither Grant Morgan nor Eva Morgan ever acquired
any title nor even a "color of title" to the real estate described
in the complaint. The Morgans never paid any taxes assessed
against the said real estate. The deeds to Grant Morgan do
not describe any portion of the land described in the complaint.
It is elementary that a deed to tracts A, C, and D which do
not describe tract B nor any portion thereof, cannot create any
color of title to tract B. The Morgans have no color of title
to the land described in the complaint.
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With respect to the house, only half of it was built on
the land described in the complaint. Grant Morgan acquired
title only to that portion in Section 15. Grant Morgan did not
purchase the portion of the house which is on the land described in the complaint, nor the pump-house nor the pipeline.
David Burt Affleck probably could not recover himself, and
he never assigned any alleged right of recovery to the Morgans
for such portion of the improvements made. However, even
if David Burt Affleck had given Grant Morgan a bill of sale
or other instrument designed to sell and transfer to the Morgans
the portion of the house on the land in dispute and the pumphouse and pipeline, the Morgans could not possibly recover
for the reason that the court awarded an easement for use of
those fixtures entirely to defendants, although the court was
in error. The trial court in awarding the use of such fixtures
to defendants should have ordered them to remove the same
from the plaintiffs' property. The defendants want the improvements and everything around them. They want to "eat
their cake and have it too." There is no provision under our
occupying claimants' statute for any relief where the alleged
improvement is partially on the land described in the decree
and partly on some other land, nor where the claimant continues to have the use of it.
As to the fish pond there is a question whether it is located
on the land of plaintiffs or on land belonging to David A.
Affleck Association, Inc., which is not a party to the suit,
or partly on the Association land and partly on land of plaintiffs. David Burt Aflleck never conveyed the fish pond and
did not purport to transfer that land on which it is located
to Grant Morgan. The Morgans could not recover for any of
those improvements which were made at the expense of David
Burt Affleck, and which were never purchased by the defendants. The Morgans seek to unjustly enrich themselves with
respect to items which they never purchased nor contracted
to purchase.
45
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The only improvements which the Morgans made consisted of putting a toilet on the property, making some paths,
building a patio partially on plaintiffs' property and partially
on Lots 1 and 2 of Merrywood, and part of a rock wall. As
to the patio there could not be any recovery for the reason
that it is only partially on the land in dispute. None of the
alleged improvements were built in good faith with an honest
belief that the Morgans had title.
There was ample evidence that Grant Morgan knew he
did not have any title whatsoever. The evidence does not
support the contention that plaintiffs and their predecessors
stood by and watched Morgan "make improvements," or that
they assented to the encroachments. The activities of the
Morgans were at least partially concealed by brush and trees.
The admissions of Grant Morgan show that he knew there
was some property to the north of Lots 1 and 2 of Merrywood
which had been purchased by the Reimanns. He knew he
had not purchased that property. He was aware of that
situation in 1948. In 1950 he had negotiations with Dr.
Pendleton and with Reimann to acquire a strip of land on
the north side of Lots 1 and 2 of Merrywood 161;2 feet in
width. All of the alleged improvements made by Morgan
were made on that 161;2 foot strip which in 1950 he negotiated to acquire from the Reimanns. Morgan was put on
notice in 1950 during a conference with Affleck and Reimann
that the Reimanns also owned land to the north of the 161;2
strip which Morgan wanted the Reimanns deed to him. In
the presence of Morgan, Gordon Burt Affleck told Reimann
that he wanted his brother David Burt Affleck protected with
a strip of land; that if the exchange with Morgan did not
go through Affleck himself wanted a tract of land, and that
he also wanted his father and mother protected with a rightof-way.
Grant Morgan admitted that he never paid any attention
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to boundary linesj that he made no attempt to determine where
his boundary line was when he started to build the patio; and
that he was not "concerned about determining boundary lines
at all." (R. 595-596). The alleged "parking lot" was made
in 1950, but there is no evidence that it was on the property
described in the complaint. The drain tile was laid within the
boundaries of Lots 1 and 2 of Merrywood, and there is no
evidence that it extended over the line. Morgan said he did
not know where the boundaries were within 20 or 25 feet,
but he knew it was marshy along the creek. Morgan claimed
that he put in a horseshoe court on the land in dispute some
years ago, but he admitted that he did not know whether
it was on the plaintiffs' land. He did not know whether the
septic tank used in connection with the house is on the land
in dispute. (R. 598). There is evidence that Morgan moved
the toilet onto the land in question after 1951. Starting 1954
Morgan started to build a patio partially on the land deeded
to plaintiff, but brush obscured the view.
The elements of good faith are utterly lacking. Morgan
was utterly indifferent to boundaries. Within a year after
negotiating to obtain title to a strip of land by exchange,
Morgan entered onto the land following his purchase of
property farther to the north. Morgan was on notice that the
predecessors of plaintiffs owned the land between Lots 1 and
2 of Merrywood and the land farther to the north in Section
15 owned by David Burt Affleck. As pointed out in Day v.
Jones, supra, (112 Utah 286, 187 P. 2d 181), where notice
of lack of title is sufficient to induce a reasonably prudent
person to investigate, ignoring such notice does not comport
with a claim of good faith; for "appellant should have, before
maRing the improvements, diligently and conscientiously examined the title in the light of the adverse claim. Of course,
Morgan had no title to examine. He knew he had not received
a deed to the property in question from anyone. The trial
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court did not and could not possibly treat the acts of the
Morgans as manifesting good faith. In 1955 Morgan was
told to get off the Reimann lands. Grant Morgan's indifference
to rights of others, his contempt for the facts brought to his
attention, and his willful conduct in attemping to appropriate
to his own use property which he knew he did not purchase
and which he knew David Burt Affleck did not own, precludes
appellants from obtaining any judicial relief.
On page 18 appellants urge that the Morgans "upon
obtaining the deeds from Burt Affleck intended to claim, and
did claim, possession of all of the land south to their own
land which they had possessed and use since 1912." That they
intended to claim title to land which was not described in
their deed is quite obvious; but their claims were not in good
faith and were not asserted openly for some time. Their
intention to take over land to which they knew they had no
title merely aggravates their trespass. It did not give them
color of title. It emphasizes their utter lack of good faith.
POINT 6.
CONTRARY TO ARGUMENT OF APPELLANTS, THE
TRIAL COURT PERMITTED THE MORGANS TO PRESENT ANY COMPETENT EVIDENCE THEY COULD
PRODUCE AS TO ALLEGED EASEMENTS, AS WELL AS
ANY PROFFERS OF PROOF DEFENDANTS DESIRED TO
MAKE.
The argument of Point V in the brief of appellants is
utterly devoid of any merit. A lot of time was wasted in court
by the various attempts of the defendants to present evidence
as to alleged "prescriptive" use of the plaintiffs' land. The
defendant Morgan testified to a lot of immaterial and incompetent matters. He testified to a horseshoe court, a parking
area, bridges, footpaths, and about recreational excursions,
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but he could not show that any of those activities prior to
1954 were conducted on any part of the plaintiffs' lands except
occasionally. He was not regularly in the canyon until 1949.
Counsel advised the court that the Morgans were going to
show "prescriptive easements" and "adverse use." All the
Morgans could show were sporadic acts of trespass during years
prior to 1954, and repeated trespasses since 1954 whereby the
plaintiffs were deprived of the use and enjoyment of the
property.
The defendants did not prove any prescriptive right-ofway, nor any other easement which could be acquired by
prescription. The law does not recognize a general "wandering
easement" to roam over the lands of another. The court advised
counsel that if the Morgans sought to show an easement in
gross he would rule that such an easement could not be acquired
by prescription. The idea that some possible encroachment
onto the land of another by playing baseball or pitching
horseshoes, or roaming through the brush, or gazing on the
trees and birds and wild flowers, could ripen into a prescriptive
easement is patently absurd. Appellants cite no cases which
could possibly sustain their unique contentions.
During the trial appellants asserted a claim of "exclusive
use and possession'' of the property by virtue of their trespasses. They could not possibly establish any prescriptive
easement for exclusive enjoyment under the law. They argue
that the recreational uses in connection with the enjoyment
of the summer homes were "appurtenant to and necessary for
the enjoyment and use of th summer home." The cases they
cite do not support, but refute their arguments. In the case of
Ernest v. Allen, 55 Utah 272, 184 P. 287, cited by appellants,
the grantor of a tract of land reserved "an equal right" with
the grantee to use a tract of land for vehicles, etc. The question
in that case was whether the reservation in the deed created
an eastment appurtenant to a specific tract of land or consti-
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tuted an easement in gross, although the grantor admittedly
owned other lands to which she needed access over the land
in question. In Btrtolina v. Frates, 89 Utah 238, 57 P. 2d 346,
this Court certainly did not announce any doctrine such as
asserted by the Morgans. What this Court said was that
"Where a person claims to have acquired an easement by
prescription over another's land, he must show that he has
acquired it by his own continuous, open, uninterrupted, and
adverse use under claim of right for the 20-year prescriptive
period," and that the use must not be "by license or favor."
In 1 Thompson on Real Property, sec. 417, page 683,
it is stated that "An exclusive right of possession cannot be
established by prescription, but only a disqualified right for
a particular purpose," citing rrTripp v. Bailey, 74 Utah 57,
276 P. 912, 69 A. L. R. 1417. The text writer states at page
690 of the same volume that where large areas of "privately
owned land are open and unenclosed, owners generally do
not object to persons passing over them for their convenience,
and many such roads are made and used. Under such circumstances, a person so using such ways cannot acquire a
permanent right unless his intention to do so be known by
the owner or so plainly apparent from the acts that knowledge
should be imputed to the owner. Thus sporadic passage over
land for the purpose of temporary convenience or for emergency use is insufficient to create a way of prescription."
(Italics added.)
In Deseret Livestock Co. v. Sharp, ________ (Utah) ________ , 259
P. 2d 607 at 610-611, the defendant claimed a right to use
an area 2000 feet in width across plaintiff's land for "trailing
sheep,'' although in the trailing operations all of the forage
would be eaten by the sheep. This Court said:
" ... In the instant case we have a situation where
the plaintiff's land is of little value except for the grazing of livestock and if we deprive plaintiff of this
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benefit, it is left with an empty fee interest, requiring
the payment of taxes but no commensurate value ...

*

*

*

*

"The courts have announced a contigous rule when
dealing with an easement, saying that it must be a
right to use the land of another for a special purpose,
not inconsistent with the general property in the landowner. Nielson v. Sandberg, 105 Utah 93, 141 P. 2d
696; Etz v. Mamerow, 72 Ariz. 228, 233 P. 2d 442 ... "
In Etz v. Mamerow, 72 Arizona 228, P. 2d 442 at 444,
the court said:
"An allegation of exclusive possession is wholly inconsistent with the theory of establishing an easement.
The right to possess, to use and to enjoy land upon
which an easement is claimed remains in the owner
of the fee except in so far as the exrcise of such right
is inconsistent with the purpose and character of the
easement. Pinkerton v. Pritchard, 71 Ariz. 117, 223
P. 2d 933; Lanzago v. San Joaquin Light & Power
Corp., 32 Cal. App. 2d 678, 90 P. 2d 825. An easement
is a right which one person has to use the land of
another for a special purpose. Callahan v. Walters,
Tex. Civ. App. 190 S. W. 829. It is the right to use the
land of another for a special purpose not inconsistent
with a general property in the owner. It is distinguished
from the occupation and enjoyment of the land itself."
The defendants Morgan argued in the opposition to all
of the recognized authorities on the subject in asking for a
prescriptive easement for "exclusive use and enjoyment of the
property." Appellants attempted to transform their willful
trespasses during the past few years into an "easement of
exclusive enjoyment," which is entirely alien to the law. The
Morgans are quite willing for the plaintiffs to continue to pay
the taxes.
On page 20 the Morgans admit that "All of the property
was formerly owned by Alvaro A. Pratt," which is quite a
concession after arguing some pages previously that the Pratts
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did not own all of it. However, without a shred of evidence
to support their claims they assert that the Pratt title was
subject to "easements." The Pratt title was not subject to
any easements. Appellants then say that the court should have
"granted an easement by prescription upon these properties
for the uses covered by the proffer of proof." Neither the
testimony nor the "proffer of proof" showed the creation of
any easements. Appellants tried to create some nebulous
''easement'' after their own engineers shattered their unfounded
claims of title. It is elementary that if a person asserts a
right-of-way by prescription, for example, he has to show just
where it is located. It must be definitely located and definite
in dimensions. The Morgans did not know just where the
boundaries were situated nor where the cars were parked,
except· that they admitted that it was marshy along the north
line of Lots 1 and 2 of Merrywood so that cars and vehicles
could not park there. Having wandered from one unfounded
theory to another, the appellants having seized the property
which they did not own, made the presumptuous claim that
they had an easement of exclusive use, which is a total stranger
to the law. Actual and punitive damages should be assessed
against the Morgans for their unconscionable conduct.
POINT 7.
THE COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED APPELLANTS'
THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT AGAINST DAVID BURT
AFFLECK AND WIFE. THE APPEAL IS OBVIOUSLY
DESIGNED TO HARASS SAID RESPONDENTS AND
THIS COURT SHOULD ASSESS DAMAGES AGAINST
THE MORGANS FOR PROLONGING THE GROUNDLESS LITIGATION AGAINST THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANTS.
Appellants forced the third party defendants to come into
court on a groundless claim of "breach of warranty." The
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Morgans falsely alleged that David Burt Affleck and wife
had sold and conveyed to Grant Morgan by two warranty deeds,
the land described in the complaint. The property described
in the complaint lies entirely in Section 22. The properties
conveyed to Grant Morgan in 1951 and 1952 are situated
entirely in Section 15. The land described in Exhibit 15-D does
not even adjoin onto the land of plaintiffs. The deed descriptions are tied to the northwest corner of Section 15. There
was not the slightest excuse for trying to stretch the deed
descriptions to cover any part of the land owned by plaintiffs.
Accusations against David Burt Affleck of "willful and
malicious breach of warranty, if he did not so inform Grant
Morgan at the time of the purchase," are inexcusable and in
defiance of the law and the facts. Grant Morgan admitted
that he never had any discussion with David Burt Affleck
about boundaries. The record shows that Grant Morgan was
on notice that there was land between the north line of Lots
1 and 2 of Merrywood and the David Burt Affleck property
which neither Grant Morgan nor David Burt Affleck owned.
Morgan did not tell Affleck he wanted to buy. There was no
agreement except the deeds themselves for the sale of any
property. Morgan's own broker prepared the deeds. Neither
deed mentions any house nor any other fixtures.
The Morgans have tried to alter the express language of
those deeds by reading into those deeds a description of land
which the grantors never owned and which they never agreed
to sell. The argument on page 21 that both parties "intended"
to sell and to buy "down to the fence lines" is untrue, but
even if true would be immaterial, since a deed cannot be
varied by parol. Neither David Burt Affleck nor Grant Morgan
ever paid any taxes on the land described in the complaint.
David Burt Affleck offered to sell his property for $7,500.
Grant Morgan knew that there was a serious question as to
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Lvw far south the Affleck land extended, and being a shrewd
business man in the auto finance business, he made a counter
offer of only $4,500, or 9/15th of Affleck's valuation. Morgan
did not contract to buy anything more than David Burt Affleck
then owned. The deeds did not convey any house nor any
other improvements except the portions situated on the land
described in the deeds.
There was no conceivable breach of warranty. There
has not been a failure of title in any particular as to any land
described in the deeds or any improvements within the
boundaries of those deeds. The argument that the trial court
"divested Mr. Morgan of over one-half of his home, plus
all of the land and improvements lying South of the resurveyed
line and North of Lot 1, Merrywood Subdivision," is contrar}
to the record. Grant Morgan never was invested with any titl(
to any land or improvements outside the boundaries of the
descriptions of land in the deeds from David Burt Affleck.
Consequently, Morgan was never divested of any title, and
the contention that he was divested of title is plain fiction.
Furthermore, although Morgan only bought half of the house
the court, by granting easements, actually awarded the use
of all of it to him, but failed to require the defendants to
remove it from the land of plaintiffs.
In the case of Van Cott v. Jacklin, 63 Utah 412, 226 P.
460, the plaintiff sued for breach of warranty. Included in
the warranty deed was a small tract of land which the defendant did not own. Defendant alleged that plaintiff knew
the boundaries of the land defendant owned and also that
defendant did not intend to sell any land except the land
which defendant owned. This Court held that what either
of the parties might have intended contrary to the recitals
in the deed was immaterial, and that the deed description
could not be altered by parol evidence:
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"As every lawyer well knows, the law is well settled
that deeds, like all other written instruments, may not
be contradicted, varied, or added to by parol. While
that is not precisely what was attempted in this case,
in the form stated, yet limiting plaintiff's rights to the
boundary lines as they appear upon the land is in legal
effect the same as though the defendant had been permitted to vary the terms of the written description of
the land conveyed by him and to withdraw the small
area in dispute from the effect of his covenants of
warranty and for quiet enjoyment. The foregoing covenants are inserted in deeds of conveyance for the protection of the purchaser as against any defect of title
and he has a right to rely on the deed as written as
against outward appearances or even as against verbal
statements to the contrary . . . "
The case at bar is the converse of Van Cott v. Jacklin
David Burt Affleck made no representations whatsoever to
anyone. In fact, Morgan had no discussion with him personally.
The lands described in the two deeds, Exhibits 14-D and 15-D,
do not cover any of the land described in the complaint. There
has been no failure of title to any land described in the two
deeds. Grant Morgan has not been dispossessed. On the
contrary, the Morgans have dispossessed the plaintiffs of their
land. The Morgans not only took possession of all of the
land conveyed by them, but in addition thereto they have seized
possession of plaintiffs' land with knowledge that they did
not pay for it nor complete an agreement to purchase any
part of it although in 1950 Grant Morgan negotiated to
purchase from plaintiffe' predecessor part of the land now
owned by plaintiffs.
There is no merit to the argument that the grantors
"intended to pass title" to that portion of the house which
was not on the land conveyed. Parol evidence is inadmissible
to contradict the express language of the deeds. As stated in
6 Thompson on Real Property, page 439, sec. 3270:
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"Regardless of the parties' intent, a deed passes title
to no property other than that which it describes. A
deed cannot extend possession to lands not described
therein, nor can a specific description be extended to
include property not within its terms . . . "
As stated in 6 Thompson on Real Property, sec. 3287,
extrinsic evidence can not be resorted to in order to
"contradict the deed, or make a description of other
land than that described in the deed. It cannot be used
to make the deed convey land not embraced in the
words used to describe the subject-matter of the deed,
but only to ascertain the intention of the parties as
expressed by such words."
There was no dispute as to the fact that "stake #31" and
"stake #32" mentioned in the deed refer to points on the
Old Arm Chair plat (Exhibit 5-P). The exact location of those
stakes was described with reference to the northwest corner
of Section 15.
The case of Van Cott v. Jacklin, supra, ( (226 P. 460),
refers to the well-established rule that covenants of warranty
extend only to the lands described in the deed. As explained
in 7 Thompson on Real Property, page 217:
"The covenant of warranty is intended as an assurance or guarantee of title; it does not enlarge or curtail
the estate granted in the premises of a deed but guarantees such estate as may be granted ... "
On page 218 of the same volume it is stated:

rrcovenant of warranty limited to estate and land
conveyed.-The covenant of warranty applies to the
estate conveyed, and can not enlarge that estate. If the
deed conveys merely the grantor's interest in the land,
a covenant of general warranty in it is limited and
restricted to such interest, and does not warrant the
land against a superior title in another.
"It is limited as well to the particular parcel of
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ground intended to be conveyed according to the description in the deed."·
The intent of the parties must be ascertained from the
express language of the deed. The two deeds from David
Burt Affleck to Grant Morgan were prepared by the agent
of Grant Morgan. They are limited to the land to which
David Burt Affleck had record title. Obviously, the grantors
did not intend to convey nor to warrant title to more land
than they owned. The south boundary of the deed description
in Exhibit 14-D runs through the middle of the house because
the house was built across the boundary line. David Burt
Affleck could not by parol evidence be proved to have some
intention to sell land which he did not own. He did not own
land south of the south line of Section 15. His intention is
legally expressed in the deed. Except for the language "to
the south line of Section 15," the deed description would be
about 20 feet short of reaching the south line of Section 15.
Defendants had a competent survey in 195 7 which followed
the deed d.escriptions, ·and which survey clearly showed that
the Morgans never acquired any title to the land described
in the complaint, and also that the Morgans had no cause
of action against their grantors for breach of any covenant of
warranty.
The deeds did not warrant that there was a house or
other fixtures on the lands conveyed. The covenants of
warranty could only relate to the land described in the deed,
not to fixtures and improvements on adjoining property not
described in the deed. With full knowledge of what was disclosed by the 1957 survey, the defendants Morgan prevailed
upon the district court to order David Burt Affleck and wife
brought into this litigation as third-party defendants by falsely
alleging that said third party defendants had deeded to Grant
Morgan the land owned by the plaintiffs. The Morgans had
a survey plat (Exhibit 64-D) which clearly shows that one
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deed Exhibit 14-D did not extend south of the south line of
Section 15 and that the other deed Exhibit 15-D does not by
any possible construction extend down to the south line of
Section 15. Dragging the third party defendants into the case
could only create confusion, annoyance and expense.
Months after the suit was filed, in the fall of 1959, with
full knowledge of the fact that the deed descriptions did not
follow any fence lines, the Morgans had an abortive "fence
line survey," which utterly disregarded the deed descriptions
and which contradicted their own valid 1957 survey which
followed the deed descriptions. Furthermore, that "fence line
survey" showed a section of fence which did not exist in 1957
or 1958, or at any time prior to September 1959. Such "fence
line survey'' was not tied to a government corner, but to a
nonexistent fictitious corner not mentioned in the deeds. In
an effort to disparge the title of plaintiffs, defendants Morgan
attempted to assail and contradict the official United States
surveys and the field notes pertaining thereto, in violation of
every known rule.
The defendants Morgan never had any cause of action
against third party defendants. Their claims of $12,100!
damages for "breach of warranty" are utterly fictitious. The
appeal from the judgment dismissing the third party complaint
with prejudice is designed for delay. The third party defendants
therefore move that this Honorable Court assess damages
against the Morgans for an unwarranted prosecution of such
appeal.
ON THE CROSS-APPEAL OF PLAINTIFFS
POINT 8.
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT WARRANT THE GRANTING OF ANY EASEMENT TO GRANT MORGAN AND
EVA MORGAN; AND THE PORTIONS OF THE JUDG-
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MENT AND DECREE QUOTED IN THE CROSS-APPEAL
SHOULD BE STRICKEN FROM THE JUDGMENT AND
DECREE. THE ABSENCE OF DAVID BURT AFFLECK
FROM THE STATE OF UTAH FOR A PERIOD OF FOUR
YEARS CO:N"STITUTED A BREAK IN THE PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD, ALTHOUGH HIS ABSENCE WAS DUE
TO MILITARY SERVICE.
The plaintiffs and respondents, Gordon Burt Affleck and
JOSEPHINE F. AFFLECK, his wife, have cross-appealed from
those portions of the judgment and decree (all of paragraph
9 and specified portions of paragraph 8, 12, 13 and 14) which
grant to the Morgans an easement on the land of plaintiffs
over the exact area on which the house encroaches and easements for continued use of the pumphouse and pipeline. (R.
132-133). What the court did in effect was to grant to the
Morgans an exclusive rental-free lease of the entire house
and exclusive rental-free lease of the pumphouse and pipeline
for the period of time in which those fixtures remain in existence, although the Morgans never purchased nor otherwise
acquired title to anything within the boundaries of plaintiffs'
land.
If the court wanted to allow the Morgans to have the
use of those fixtures which extend over onto plaintiffs' land, it
should have required the Morgans to remove the house, pumphouse and pipeline from plaintiffs' lanc}1 within a reasonable
time. The house is on stilts as shown by the photographs
in evidence, and it can be moved. It was error to grant the
Morgans easements which amount to rent-free leases when
they have never acquired any title thereto by the deeds executed
by David Burt Affleck and wife, or from anyone else.

As indicated in Alford v. Rodgers, 242 Ala 370, 6 So. 2d
409, a person acquires title only to the boundary line in his
deed and he does not acquire title to land beyond it as an
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"appurtenance." Furthermore, as indicated in Olsen v. Noble,
207 Ga. 899, 76 S. E. 775, 780, in order for an alleged easement
to be appurtenant it must already be in existence; it cannot
be an inchoate prescriptive claim over the land of another.
If a person seeks to convey an inchoate prescriptive claim
which has not yet ripened into an easement, such claim must
be specifically described in the deed. (a) There was no 20year period of use which could have established an easement,
even if the use had been of the character which could have
created an easement by 20 years' use. Bertolina v. Frates, supra,
(89 Utah 238, 57 P. 2d 346), holds that the use must not
only be a claim of right, but must be "continuous, open, uninterrupted, and adverse" for the entire 20-year prescriptive
period. David Burt Affleck did not know where his boundaries
were situated. Furthermore, there was an interruption in the
use in 1941 after only 6 years' use. He was absent from the
property for nearly 4 years while in military service. . The
Solders' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940, 50 U.S.C.A.
Appendix, sees. 525 et seq., did not specify that prescriptive
use should be deemed to run in favor of the service man
while he was absent in military service. If such a provision
had been incorporated into the statute it would likely have
unconstitutional. Assuming that prescription would begin to
run again after return from military service, there was no
period of 20 years. Even if the period prior to the military
service were added to the period subsequent to military service,
(which would not be permissible) there would be less than a
period of 20 years. The law requires the prescriptive use to
be continuous for 20 years, and there was no period of 20
years.
(b) The encroachment of the house over onto the land of
plaintiffs' could never ripen into an "easement for exclusive
use and enjoyment" advocated by appellants. As aptly stated
in 1 Thompson on Real Property, Sec. 417, page 682: ••An
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interest in the land of another, greater than an incorporeal
hereditament, such as the possession and use of a building
thereon, cannot be established by prescription." At page 68:>
the text writer states, "an exclusive right of possession cannot
be established by prescription," citing Tripp v. Bagley, 74
Utah 57, 276 P. 912, 69 A.L.R. 1417. Neither the Morgans
nor David Burt Affleck paid any taxes on the land in question,
so that title by adverse possession could not be acquired.
(c) The pipeline and pumphouse installed in 1935 were
substantially concealed below the surface, so that prescription
could not begin to run until notice, and no notice of any claim
was ever given. Independent of that fact, no easement for
conducting water could be acquired over the land of another
without having a vested right. The evidence is conclusive
that David Burt Affleck never acquired a water right under
the laws of the State of Utah. He never filed an application
with the State Engineer, and he did not acquire a water right
from someone who owned one. (R. 486). As indicated in
Neilson v. Sandberg, 105 Utah 93, 141 P. 2d 696, where a
claimant asserts a prescriptive right-of-way for water he must
first show that he acquired a vested and accrued water right.
Since he did not file any application to appropriate, it was
impossible to acquire a water right by adverse use when the
use was not initiated until 1935. There is no proof that Grant
Morgan ever acquired any water right for such property. The
prescriptive period could not begin to run for a pipeline rightof-way until a water right were acquired.
No easements could have been acquired by prescription.
nevertheless, the trial court by those portions of its decree
excepted to on the cross-appeal, in effect gave the Morgans
an "easement for exclusive use" of the portion of the house
and the pumphouse and pipeline situated within the boundaries
of plaintiffs' land. In effect the court fastened on plaintiffs
without their consent and withouf' consideration a rent-free
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lease in favor of the Morgans which practically takes the
heart out of plaintiffs' land and greatly restricts the use of
plaintiffs' land for an indefinite period. It is inequitable to
allow the Morgans the use of those fixtures which encroach
without requiring them to remove the same from plaintiffs'
land within a reasonable period of time.
CONCLUSION
Every finding of fact which is adverse to the Morgans
1s amply supported by competent evidence. Every provision
of the decree which is adverse to them should be affirmed.
The only error of the trial court was in granting the Morgans
easements over the area where the house encroaches and for
pipeline and pumphouse for the period in which those fixtures
shall exist. The court in effect granted rent-free leases to the
Morgans, and placed burdens on the land of the plaintiffs for
which they did not bargain, and which were not established
according to law. If the Morgans are to be granted the exclusive use of those fixtures which encroach on plaintiffs' land,
it should be on condition that they remove the same from
plaintiffs' land within a reasonable period of time.
The court proper! y reserved the question of damages
caused by the trespasses by the Morgans. Damages should be
assessed against the Morgans for maintaining the appeal
against David Burt Affleck and wife, and thereby prolonging
the groundless litigation against third-party defendants.
Respectfully submitted,
McKAY and BURTON
MACOY A. McMURRAY
Attorneys fo1' Plaintiffs, Respondents
and Cross-Appellants
PAUL E. REIMANN
Atto1'ney for Third-Party Defendants
and Respondents
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